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Abstract
In this note, I propose a normative updating rule, extended Bayesianism, for the incor-
poration of probabilistic information arising from the process of becoming more aware.
Extended Bayesianism generalizes standard Bayesian updating to allow the posterior to
reside on richer probability space than the prior. I then provide an observable criterion
on prior and posterior beliefs such that they were consistent with extended Bayesianism.
Key words: extended Bayesianism; reverse Bayesianism; conditional expectations.
Conditioning on Unforeseen Evidence
Decision maker’s (DM’s) who are unaware, cannot conceive of, nor articulate, the decision rele-
vant contingencies they are unaware of. Nonetheless, such agents may hold sophisticated probabilis-
tic beliefs regarding those contingencies they are aware of. How then should an agent’s probabilistic
beliefs respond to the discovery of novel contingencies? This note proposes a normative updating
rule for the incorporation of probabilistic information arising from the process of becoming more
aware.
Let Ω denote an (at most countable) objective, albeit possibly unobservable, state space.1 Let
Σt, a sigma-algebra on Ω, represent the events the DM can conceive of at t ∈ {0, 1}. By nature
of the problem, we assume that Σ0 ⊆ Σ1. The DM’s subjective uncertainty, given her current
understanding, is taken to be a probability distribution, pit, on the probability space (Ω,Σt). Set
St = {ω ∈ Ω | pit(E) > 0 for the smallest E ∈ Σt with E ⊇ ω} to denote the support of pit. It is
easy to show this is the smallest event in Σt with pit-probability 1.
The tenet of reverse Bayesianism (RB), as introduced by Karni and Vierø (2013), states that
when the DM becomes more aware, her probabilistic assessments regarding previously understood
contingencies do not change. Formally: pi1(E) = pi0(E) for all E ∈ Σ0, so that pi1 is an extension
of pi0 to the richer algebra.
2 Thus, RB essentially posits that becoming more aware is not in and of
itself informative—learning how to distinguish between new events does not provide any probabilistic
information regarding the likelihood of those events previously understood.
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1There are no intrinsic problems in entertaining uncountable state spaces. The conditions stated in this paper
are in spirit all that is needed. However, care needs to taken as the support of a measure is no longer well defined
(without, e.g., additional topological restrictions) so conditioning events are identified only up to sets of measure zero.
2In Karni and Vierø (2013), there are actually two distinct ways the DM can become more aware, refinement, which
is essentially what is characterized here, and expansion where by the underlying state-space gets larger. It seems to
me that allowing the state-space to expand is fundamentally at odds with the natural definition of a state space as
a representation of all decision relevant states of affairs. One can diffuse this tension and represent expansions via
refinements by setting an event E⋆ ∈ Σ0 to collect “that which is not yet understood.” E⋆ gets carved up with each
new discovery. This latter method has the added benefit of allowing the DM to reason about her own unawareness.
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There are many intuitive situations, however, where becoming aware intrinsically does provide
information. Incontrovertibly, if the DM becomes aware of an event E, she must learn that she used
to be unaware of E.3 But, even without appealing to introspection, it is reasonable that the mere
existence of a concept can serve as evidence regarding contingencies the DM was already aware of.
This is essentially the “problem of old evidence” (Glymour, 1980).
Example 1. Players i and j are playing a card game. i initially thinks it is highly likely that he fully
understands the rules of the game, and further that j’s behavior is not rationalizable according to
these rules. Hence i believes its is highly likely that j is irrational. i then discovers that there are
in fact two variants of the game. Although i does not learn any hard information about the rules
of either variant, he now places much less probability on the event that he fully understands the
rules (of the game j believes they are playing), and therefore less probability on the event that j is
irrational.
Even if becoming aware does not intrinsically change beliefs, it may well be that by the time
the DM’s beliefs can actually be elicited, she has taken into account some additional probabilistic
information. That is to say, despite the DM adhering to RB, the beliefs elicited at time 1 reflect not
only the expansion of awareness but also conventional updating.
Definition. Say that (pi1, pi0) satisfies extended Bayesianism (EB), if there exists a probability
distribution p¯i on (Ω,Σ1) such that
ec1 p¯i(S1) > 0,
ec2 p¯i(E) = pi0(E) for all E ∈ Σ0, and
ec3 pi1(E) =
p¯i(E∩S1)
p¯i(S1)
for all E ∈ Σ1.
An interpretation is as follows: If (pi0, pi1) satisfies EB it is as if pi1 was constructed by condi-
tioning pi0 on the event S1. We say ‘as if’ because when S1 /∈ Σ0 then the pi0 probability of S1 is
undefined. However, in this case, we make sense of conditioning by first extending pi0 to the richer
algebra (pi0 → p¯i) and then constructing pi1 by conditioning this extension (p¯i → pi1). The overall
transition (pi0 → pi1) satisfies reverse Bayesianism if and only if S1 = Ω so that the conditioning
step is trivial and satisfies canonical Bayesianism if Σ0 = Σ1 so that the discovered evidence was
expected at time 0.
Example 2. Let Σ0 = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, Σ0 be generated by the partition {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}} and Σ1 by
the discrete partition. Let pi0 be given by pi0({ω1}) = pi0({ω2, ω3}) =
1
2 . Finally let pi1(ω1) =
2
3 ,
pi1(ω2) =
1
3 and pi1(ω3) = 0. Then (pi0, pi1) satisfies EB, as witnessed by p¯i on (Ω,Σ1) given by
p¯i(ω1) =
1
2 , p¯i(ω2) =
1
4 and p¯i(ω3) =
1
4 .
Example 3. Let Σ0 = {∅,Ω}. Then (pi0, pi1) satisfies EB irrespective of pi1.
3In purely semantic “state-space” models, introspection is not captured. However, by starting with a first order
language with an awareness modality and setting the states as possible worlds, one can make precise sense out of
the event “i used to be unaware of the event E.” See, for example, Halpern and Reˆgo (2009); Halpern and Piermont
(2019).
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Figure 1: A visual representation of the state space from Example 4.
Example 4. Let Ω = N × {A,B} with Σ0 generated by N and Σ0 by the discrete partition. Set
pi0(E0) =
1
2 and pi0(En) = 3
−n for n > 0. Set pi1(E0A) = pi1(EnB) = 0 and pi0(EnA) = 2
−n for all
n > 0 (see figure 1). Then (pi0, pi1) does not satisfy EB.
Fixing S0 and S1 (and, of course, the state space and sigma algebras) there may be multiple pi0’s
such that (pi0, pi1) satisfies EB for a fixed pi1 (namely those priors that keep the relative likelihoods
of events within S1 equal). Also, there might be multiple pi1’s such that (pi0, pi1) satisfies EB for a
fixed pi0 (namely those posteriors that ascribe different probabilities to E ∈ Σ1 \ Σ0).
Observability
Bayesian updating is the normative benchmark for how probabilistic judgements should respond
to the acquisition of new evidence. Unfortunately, in cases where S1 /∈ Σ0, Bayes’ rule cannot be
directly verified, as there was no prior belief regarding the likelihood of the conditioning event. The
notion of commensurability, below, provides a simple resolution, advancing an observable restriction
on (pi0, pi1) equivalent extended Bayesianism.
Definition. Say that pi1 is commensurate to pi0 if
p1 inf
E∈S0
pi0(E)
pi1(E)
> 0, and,
p2 for all E,F ∈ Σ0 with E ⊆ S1,
pi0(E)
pi0(F )
≤
pi1(E)
pi1(F )
(1)
and where (1) holds with equality whenever F ⊆ S1. (We here associate
x
0 with +∞ for all
x ∈ R.)
Remark 1. For all E ∈ Σ0 with E ⊆ S1, pi0(E) ≤ pi1(E). This follows by setting F to Ω in (p1).
Remark 2. (p1) implies that pi1 is absolutely continuous with respect to pi0: S1 ⊆ S0. If this was
not the case, then F , the smallest event in Σ0 containing S1 \ S0, is non-empty. Since F ∩ S1 6= ∅
and F ∩ S0 = ∅, we must have pi1(F ) > 0 but pi0(F ) = 0. So then
pi0(∅)
pi0(F )
= +∞ 6≤ 0 = pi1(∅)
pi1(F )
, a
contradiction.
Remark 3. If there exists a non-empty E ∈ Σ0 with E ⊆ S1, then (p2) is implied by (p1). To see
this note that for such E, we have for all F ∈ Σ1: 0 <
pi0(E)
pi1(E)
≤ pi0(F )
pi1(F )
, where Remark 2 establishes
that 0 < pi0(E).
Theorem 1. pi1 is commensurate to pi0 if and only if (pi0, pi1) satisfies EB.
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Figure 2: The existence of the extensions p¯i and p¯i′ ensure the existence of an extension p¯i′′.
Proof. The ‘if’ direction is easy: Assume (pi0, pi1) satisfies EB with p¯i the mitigating measure. Take
some E,F ∈ Σ0 with E ⊆ S1. Then, by the properties of p¯i,
pi0(E)
pi0(F )
=
p¯i(E)
p¯i(F )
≤
p¯i(E ∩ S1)
p¯i(F ∩ S1)
=
pi1(E)
pi1(F )
with equality whenever F ⊆ S1, establishing (p1). (p2) holds because
pi0(E)
pi1(E)
= p¯i(S1)
pi0(E)
p¯i(E ∩ S1)
≥ p¯i(S1)
pi0(E)
p¯i(E)
= p¯i(S1)
pi0(E)
pi0(E)
= p¯i(S1).
for all E ∈ Σ0.
Towards the ‘only if’ direction, assume that pi1 is commensurate to pi0. We must find a p¯i on
(Ω,Σ1) such that the conditions of EB hold. Since, Ω is denumerable, Σ0 and Σ1 are generated by
partitions of Ω—call theses P0 and P1, respectively—and it isuffices to specify p¯i on the cells of P1.
But, first, we must set a value, β, for p¯i(S1). If there exists an E ∈ Σ0 with E ⊆ S1, then set
β = pi0(E)
pi1(E)
. By (p1), the choice of E is irrelevant and by Remark 1, β ≤ 1. Further, Remark 2
indicates that 0 < β and following the logic of Remark 3 we have β ≤ infS0
pi0(E)
pi1(E)
. If no such E
exists, take an arbitrary 0 < β ≤ infS0
pi0(E)
pi1(E)
≤ 1.
Now for all P ∈ P1 with P ⊆ S1, set p¯i(P ) = βpi1(P ). For each Q ∈ P0, such that Q 6⊆ S1, choose
a representative PQ ∈ P1 with P
Q ⊆ Q \ S1. Set p¯i(P
Q) = pi0(Q) − βpi1(Q). Since β ≤
pi0(Q)
pi1(Q)
, this
is a well defined probability. For any remaining P ∈ P1, set p¯i(P ) = 0.
It is straightforward to verify that p¯i is a witness to (pi0, pi1) satisfying EB. First, p¯i(S1) = β > 0,
so (ec1) is satified. Next, notice for all Q ∈ P0, such that Q 6⊆ S1, p¯i(Q) = pi0(Q) by construction.
If there is some Q ∈ P0, such that Q ⊆ S1, then β =
pi0(Q)
pi1(Q)
, so that p¯i(Q) = βpi1(Q) = pi0(Q), and so
(ec2) holds for all Q ∈ P0. Finally, for pi1(E) = pi1(E∩S1) =
p¯i(E∩S1)
β
= p¯i(E∩S1)
p¯i(S1)
, so (ec3) holds.
Repeated Conditioning
If the DM discovers unforeseen evidence more than once, the observed subjective probabilities
will form a finite sequence, pi0 . . . piN , over increasingly fine algebras, Σ0 . . .ΣN . For a DM who
adheres to Bayesianism to the extent possible under unawareness, each (pin, pin+1) will satisfy EB.
Even if the modeler cannot feasibly observe each pin, this hypothesis can be falsified, since under
this assumption, (pin, pim) will satisfy EB for all all pim with m ≥ n.
Theorem 2. The diagram in Figure 2 commutes.
Proof. This can be seen easily by appealing to Theorem 1: let pi1 be commensurate to pi0 and pi2
commensurate to pi1. Appealing to (p1), we have
inf
E∈S0
pi0(E)
pi2(E)
≥ inf
E∈S0
pi0(E)
pi1(E)
pi1(E)
pi2(E)
≥ inf
E∈S0
pi0(E)
pi1(E)
inf
E∈S1
pi1(E)
pi2(E)
> 0.
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Similarly, appealing to (p2): for all E,F ∈ Σ0 ⊆ Σ1 with E ⊆ S2 ⊆ S1,
pi0(E)
pi0(F )
≤
pi1(E)
pi1(F )
≤
pi2(E)
pi2(F )
which holds with equality whenever F ⊆ S2 ⊆ S1. Thus, pi2 is commensurate to pi0; (pi0, pi2) satisfies
EB.
A Few Notes on Related Literature
Fagin and Halpern (1991) introduced the notion of outer and inner conditional probability as
the upper and lower envelopes of the conditional probabilities of all possible extensions to a richer
algebra. In the language of this paper, the outer conditional probability of pi0 on E ∈ Σ1 is
pi∗0(·|E) = sup{p¯i(·|E) | p¯i ∈ ∆(Ω,S1), p¯i extends pi0}
and the inner conditional probability is defined by replacing the sup and an inf. Thus it must be
that (pi0, pi1) satisfy EB exactly when pi1 lies inside of the outer and inner conditional probabilities
(where the conditioning event is S1) of pi0. As such, filtering through inner and outer probability
provides another, indirect, characterization of unforeseen posteriors.
As discussed in Footnote 2, Karni and Vierø (2013) consider two different ways to expand aware-
ness. If we insist on entertaining expansions of the state-space itself so that Σ0 is defined on Ω and
Σ1 on Ω∪Ω
′, then we can appropriately generalize the definition of extended Bayesianism to allow pi1
to entertain probability on newly discovered states: Setting pi1 ∈ ∆(Ω ∪ Ω′,Σ1), say (pi0, pi1) satisfy
generalized extended Bayesianism (GEB) if pi1(Ω) > 0 and (pi0, pi1(· | Ω)) satisfy EB. In this case, we
have that the overall transition (pi0 → pi1) satisfies reverse Bayesianism if and only if S1 = Ω ∪ Ω′.
Karni et al. (2018) consider the case where a DM, in the process of becoming more aware, might
simultaneously condition her beliefs with respect to some event, E. The only consider expansions
of the state space and not refinements of previously describable events (i.e., Ω expands to Ω ∪ Ω′
but Σ0 = {E ∩Ω | E ∈ Σ1}). They introduce generalized reverse Bayesianism, whereby the relative
probabilities of events must remain the same only for events in S0 ∩ S1 (rather than all of S0 as is
the case for RB). This case is clearly captured by GEB. The overall transition (pi0 → pi1), where
pi1 is defined on (Σ1,Ω ∪ Ω′), satisfies generalized reverse Bayesianism if and only if (pi0, pi1) satisfy
GEB and Σ0 = {E ∩ Ω | E ∈ Σ1}.
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